West-Pac Force Closure: US Interests in the Panama Canal
Moving the US Navy in a Contingency
Bottom Line Up Front:
Chinese sabotage of the Panama Canal in a Taiwan contingency scenario could delay force closure by more than 12 days, according to a War Quants model.
Should the United States lose access to the Panama and Suez Canal, the total distance the fleet must sail to a Taiwan contingency could increase by almost 26%, or approximately 800,000 kilometers.
The increased rhetoric and engagement over the Panama Canal reflects a recognition of its importance to US interests in the Western Hemisphere.
The Panama Canal - the Western Hemisphere’s vital maritime connection between the Atlantic and Pacific - currently commands levels of geopolitical attention not observed since President Carter negotiated the canal’s turnover to the Republic of Panama in the late 1970s. The United States retains strategic and economic interests in the canal, but the return of Great Power Competition has reinforced its importance to the US Navy and the joint force. No scenario better illustrates this importance than a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
The White House has recently expressed concerns about a Chinese company operating ports on both sides of the Panama Canal. These hubs provide China with regional economic influence and could potentially serve as launch points for cyber and special operations against the Panama Canal in the event of a Taiwan invasion scenario. Should China successfully sabotage the canal or its operations, it could delay the movement of US forces into the Pacific and enable a fait acompli strategy to quickly seize Taiwan before the United States can halt an invasion.
Where in the world is the US Navy?
To understand the Panama Canal's military significance, one must first understand the force laydown of the United States Navy. According to the homeport registry for Active and NRFA ships, the US Navy moors 248 hulls (including both surface vessels and submarines) across 25 homeports, as summarized in the table below.
Most ships are clustered in ports in New England, the Mid-Atlantic, the Southeast, Southern California, and the Pacific Northwest. In the event of a Taiwan contingency scenario, the most efficient route to the Western Pacific would encompass a journey through the Panama Canal for many of the ships stationed on the East Coast of the United States, with some exceptions. Notably, the five carrier strike groups stationed in Norfolk, Virginia would need to find an alternate route. Although the Panama Canal completed a massive capacity expansion in the last decade, its width still does not accommodate the flight decks of Ford and Nimitz-class carriers. Likewise, due to the sensitivity of their missions, SSBNs are unlikely to leverage the Panama Canal in crisis. After accounting for these constraints, I estimate that if responding to a contingency in Asia, approximately 69 US warships would need to pass through the Panama Canal to take the fastest route to the conflict theater. But what would happen if the fleet could not use it?
How might the loss of the Panama Canal affect the US Navy?
To understand the impact of a canal closure, I’ll analyze a scenario in which the US Navy moves the 69 ships that might reasonably traverse the canal in crisis from their homeports to the Philippine Sea. Using minimum-cost flow and shortest path algorithms, I’ll compare scenarios in which the Panama Canal and Suez Canal are unavailable to US forces to quantify the impact of a canal closure in terms of both total distance traveled and voyage days.
The model makes several assumptions:
All ships start at their homeports. In reality, the US Navy always has ships underway and forward deployed. However, because their locations change often and are not usually published, ships are modeled starting at their home ports.
All registered ships will be available, subject to the constraints on canal usage outlined above. This simplifying assumption ignores the fact that ships have a readiness cycle which includes dry dock (and the inability to get underway for its duration).
In the best-case scenario in the model, the Panama Canal and Suez Canal remain open to the US Navy. Under these conditions, the algorithm selects the shortest path from US homeport clusters to the Philippine Sea, with ships on the East and Gulf coasts traversing the Panama Canal into the Pacific. Where applicable, ships avoid non-permissive areas like the South China Sea and instead use an alternative route through the Timor Sea. In this best-case scenario, the fleet must sail approximately 3.07 million kilometers to get to the fight in the Philippine Sea.
In a scenario where the Suez Canal is denied, carrier strikes groups from Norfolk must sail around Africa to reach the Pacific Theater. This routing increases the total sailing distance to 3.16 million kilometers.
If the Panama Canal is denied but the Suez Canal remains open, the total distance sailed increases to 3.6 million kilometers. All US warships on the East and Gulf coasts route through the Mediterranean.
In a worst-case scenario with both the Suez and Panama canals closed, significant numbers of ships would need to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope to get to the fight. This transit increases the total sailing distance to 3.87 million kilometers. Interestingly, the Strait of Magellan is never a good option, though this result may not surprise any true mariner.
The table below captures the impact of the four route permutations described above on force closure distances in terms of total fleet kilometers traveled.
But might this impact force flow timelines?
The longer it takes for the United States to respond to Chinese aggression, the more time the People’s Liberation Army will have to gain a lodgement on Taiwan. The US Navy remains the critical combat force that can contest the invasion. Conducting a time-phased force deployment analysis further reveals how canal closures could impact US Navy ship arrival times in theater.
Assuming an average ship speed of 20 knots to account for port calls, resupply, and other delays, analysts can calculate a ship's closure time from its homeport to the Philippine Sea along the optimal paths from above. For simplicity, I assume that all ships depart simultaneously, and no vessel breaks down on the way. Across the four scenarios outlined above, the fleet arrival times diverge on day 21 of the conflict.
If the US cannot use the Panama Canal, up to 30% of its fleet could be delayed. Even if both the Panama and Suez canals are usable, US forces in the Chinese weapon engagement zone may need to persist for 30-60 days without significant support as the fleet musters its assets for decisive action. Conversely, the loss of the Suez seems less critical to US naval mobility unless it is the only canal available.
What is Old is New Again: Grading US Posture for Conflict
In 1964, a great debate raged about the value of the Panama Canal in the nuclear age. In a contemporary column, the New York Times examined arguments that the canal’s military significance had waned in a world in which the United States possessed a two-ocean navy with enough ships to contest adversaries simultaneously in both theaters, even as the Soviets clearly sought to influence and control maritime chokepoints globally through subversion. We have entered a new era of Great Power competition and maritime chokepoints are definitively back in focus. Force closure logic should inform US policy and drive a closer relationship with Panama to ensure the security of the canal. The United States cannot take sea lanes for granted and no longer has a two-theater navy. Just as it has been for a century, the Panama Canal remains a lifeline that enables the United States to project power and protect its interests with maximum efficiency.
Read More of Our Work Here:
Sustained Russian Shahed Swarms: The War of Precision Mass Continues
One Million Suicide Drones with Chinese Characteristics
FPV Math: Precision Mass for 21st-Century Warfare
Capability Analysis: AI Machine Guns for Drone Short-Range Air Defense
The views and opinions expressed on War Quants are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or organization.
Your staff work is better than some joint staffs I've seen. Thanks for the great post.